Poles must get used to second-class membership of the new, post-pandemic EU

By Marcin Kędzierski (published in cooperation with the Jagiellonian Club think tank)

It would be politically short-sighted to think that all Poland needs to bury the hatchet with Brussels is for Jarosław Kaczyński and Zbigniew Ziobro to leave the government benches. Realism points to deepening structural differences in the interests of the countries of the “old” and “new” EU. Merely removing the Law and Justice (PiS) party from power will change little.

The history of European integration has included spells – sometimes long – of fair weather. The best example might be the last decade of the 20th century and the beginning of the new century – from the Single European Act and the introduction of the so-called “four freedoms” to the single currency and the great expansion of 2004.

But there have also been storms – and the last decade of crises, beginning with 2008-2009 and Greek bankruptcy and concluding with the COVID-19 pandemic – is undoubtedly the longest-lasting in the community’s history. Although the rain and wind have died down in 2021, the atmosphere remains heavy and nobody knows whether there is another tempest on the horizon.

The good ship EU sets sail

Despite current uncertainties, the EU passed the test in managing the pandemic crisis when ordering vaccines. Although in Poland and elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the vaccination campaign is not living up to decision-makers’ expectations, overall it has been a success.

In many member states, the majority of the most vulnerable population are vaccinated. The threat of an autumn wave is causing European leaders sleepless nights, but there is a justified confidence that hospitalisations and deaths will not reach the same scale.

Similarly positive signals are coming from the economy. The member states are slowly digging themselves out of the crisis. The EU has launched a sizable, €100 billion support package for the labour market as part of the SURE programme, and most importantly, it has agreed to share the debt in the form of the recovery fund.

This is unprecedented – just two years ago, opposition from Berlin and the so-called frugal five made such a solution unthinkable. Today, the European Commission and Council are ratifying national recovery plans forming the basis to pay out funds acquired in financial markets by the entire community.

Germany may insist that this is an exception, but the history of integration teaches us that history is governed by the rule of precedence – if something was possible once, that means it can be employed again.

Even in the difficult question of migration policy, the EU is speaking in one voice. Whereas in 2015 Hungary was lambasted for building a fence on its border with Serbia, today similar solutions put into place by Vilnius and Warsaw receive encouragement from Brussels.

At the same time, loud “exit” calls heard recently in the south have died down in the European public debate. One might get the impression that the EU is consolidating and moving forward. One example is the continuation of the European Green Deal – at last, all member states have agreed to accept an increased goal to reduce emissions by at least 55% by 2030.

However, this consolidation changes the character of the bloc. Deepened integration means that member states not wishing to go in this direction will be either marginalised or on a collision course with Brussels. In the face of global challenges such as creating a post-pandemic, global trading order, starting the debate about building a new global security system or climate policy, “Eurocratic” leaders do not want to get bogged down in insignificant local problems.

On the other hand, electorates in Germany, France or Italy are unhappy that Poland and others are emerging economically unscathed from the pandemic – this was clear in the discussion on the money from the Recovery Fund allocated to Warsaw. Especially since until recently it was there that the “Polish” televisions, cookers or furniture that sold so well during lockdown were being produced.

Pushing the CEE region out from the first circle of integration, and thereby raising transaction costs for industry and encouraging it to return to southern Europe, might seem a sensible solution for the average Italian or Spaniard. Polish factories are increasingly innovative and can guarantee stable, relatively well-paid employment.

No more special treatment

Finally, consolidation is supported by finding a common enemy. This will never be the United States, China or Russia, but Poland, Hungary, and recently also Slovenia fit the bill – especially as the progressive societies of the West expect decisive responses to accusations of violations of LGBT rights.

It is therefore no surprise that recent months have seen heightened tensions between Warsaw, Budapest, Ljubljana and a few other capitals and Brussels. The potential for conflict between east and the rest of the bloc has existed since our accession.

But there are several reasons why it did not ignite sooner: (1) lack of political assertiveness from CEE countries, (2) the benefits from market expansion for west European companies, (3) the feeling among some western political elites that they owed “compensation” to post-communist countries, and (4) the protective shield from the US which quickly chills any anti-CEE sentiments.

Crucially, all these reasons have significantly weakened in recent years, and especially months. Firstly, after more than a decade and a half in the EU and after surpassing the per-capita income of certain southern EU states, CEE societies are naturally gaining higher aspirations. These, equally understandably, are not welcomed by the West, particularly at a time of global economic turmoil.

Secondly, from the point of view of the old EU, the costs and benefits resulting from liberalisation of movement of goods and services get worse every year. It is no accident that there has been increased talk in the bloc about the return of protectionism. Although this is meant to protect west European companies from Asian competition, it will result in a worse position for CEE firms.

As Germany has seen, good political ties are not essential for trading ties. After all, last year Poland became one of its top five trading partners – despite the chilly political relations between Berlin and Warsaw. At the same time, German analysts, who until recently were calling for softening tensions with Poland for economic reasons, today are backing a tougher line in the EU’s relations with Poland.

Another manifestation of the same phenomenon is the posted workers directive championed in recent years by Berlin and Paris, which is a blow to the EU’s freedom to provide services that has been beneficial to Poland.

This directive is also an expression of the third phenomenon cited above – the end of the “compensation” era. The last symbolic example of this way of thinking, aiming at stronger inclusion of CEE states, was Donald Tusk’s nomination as president of the European Council. More recently, these countries have been utterly ignored when handing out key positions in the EU and its agencies.

West European political leaders now show no hint of this inclusive way of thinking, while disputes (such as over LGBT rights) reinforce the impression that we do not belong to one club.

This idea also bolstered Donald Trump’s ascent, as he tried to play Germany and France against the other member states – mainly with symbolic gestures towards Poland and other countries of the region. At the same time, despite increasing western irritation, the American patron halted more decisive reactions to Poland or Hungary.

Joe Biden’s victory changed the situation radically, however. On the one hand, it consolidated the ideological divide between east and west, and on the other it gave the EU the green light to discipline its “unruly” members.

Warsaw and Brussels at loggerheads – with or without PiS

In the coming months, we can expect an escalation of the conflict in Brussels-Warsaw relations on many fronts: rule of law, environmental issues and energy/climate. The exception will be migration, as the solutions suggested by the EU are also the default option for the Polish government.

Another important factor is the EU Recovery Fund. For the first time, the EU can de facto block, or at least significantly delay payment of the funds negotiated at the summit. Importantly, this will not be based on the so-called rule-of-law directive, which for now is not binding, but a political decision preventing acceptance of the Polish National Recovery Plan by the European Commission. Once this mechanism is used, there will be nothing to stop it being used again.

Stopping payment of Recovery Fund money is an extremely effective stick with which to beat the Polish government, which has based its narrative ahead of the increasingly imminent elections on grand investments funded from EU money. For this reason, we can expect both far-reaching concessions from Warsaw and escalation of Brussels’ expectations.

The PiS government cannot expect concessions difficult from an internal political perspective to lead to a normalisation of relations with the EU, especially as the party finds itself trapped.

It cannot give too much away because of the part of its electorate that is not keen on Brussels and could easily be lost to the far-right Confederation (Konfederacja). Yet it cannot antagonise Brussels because for other voters the EU money is indispensable. This internal strife will only encourage European elites to hassle PiS further still.

Let us suppose that the PiS government falls and the current opposition takes over. Regardless of its makeup, the new government will definitely be more pro-European, and we can expect the rule-of-law conflict and disputes over supposed “LGBT-free zones” to be extinguished. But that would be all.

As for freedom to provide services, industrial policy, energy and climate policy, dealings with Russia – despite all the best intentions, the Polish state’s hard interests and its society’s interests clash with current EU policy in these areas.

Likewise with the euro zone – it is difficult to imagine Polish parties guided by voters’ expectations to dare to propose that the country adopt the common European currency.

Although a change of government in Poland will undoubtedly tone down the Warsaw-Brussels dispute, therefore, the tensions themselves will be hard to eliminate.

This will be even more the case as a power transfer in Poland initiated de facto “from abroad” and increasingly tough conditions of EU membership (restrictions on freedom of movement on the internal market, limited cohesion funds, increasing energy costs etc.) will trigger “Polexit” emotions in parts of society, including among opposition supporters.

The conclusion is relatively straightforward – consolidation among west European countries, irrespective of the political situation in Warsaw, will on the one hand continue to push Poland away from the EU, and on the other heighten anti-EU sentiments in Polish society.

Although Polexit remains very unlikely, we must realise that from Poland’s perspective this “new”, consolidated union will be characterised by continued restriction of freedom of movement in the internal market, lower transfer of funds from the EU budget, and lastly, major costs caused by energy transformation, for which we will only be partly reimbursed.

We must also expect that in this “new” EU our voice – for example regarding relations with Russia – will count for even less.

Is there a way back?

To what extent is this consolidation (or, as it is often called, deepened integration), a permanent and inevitable process? Is the EU really sailing into a period of post-crisis stabilisation after more than a decade of storms, just in a smaller group? Despite what some experts say, this direction of the integration processes is far from certain.

The reason for this argument is relatively simple – the pandemic has intensified individualistic attitudes, at the level both of individuals and entire states. It is true that few in Europe today criticise the EU, but this is mainly because societies in the various member states are concentrating on domestic policies and not interested in what is going on outside their borders.

This particularly concerns Germany, where the parliamentary election ending the Merkel era will take place this month. Whoever follows her will not have half the European gravitas.

Rather than foreign and European policy, the campaign is focusing on COVID-19, climate change, and politicians’ credibility. Discussions on Poland, rule of law or euro zone reform, which were present in the previous campaign, are conspicuous by their absence.

It is similar in France, which is gradually preparing for next April’s presidential election. Although Macron used the anti-CEE card in his 2017 campaign, the pandemic, but especially the domestic security threat, will take centre stage.

In Italy and Spain too, nobody is too concerned with integration. Until new big problems arise at EU level, it will be possible to continue to aim for deeper integration.

Yet this situation is naturally unstable. Should problems arise, anti-EU emotion could return as quickly as it was extinguished by billions of euro from the restructuring fund. If it then also turns out that initiatives requiring solidarity across the bloc are necessary, hellish floodgates could open that make the “exit” slogans of last decade look like child’s play.

In this sense, belief in the EU consolidation, even in a smaller form, brings many question marks, and the key dilemmas of recent years concerning growing divides between North and South remain in place. 2021 is therefore the eye of the cyclone, not the morning after the storm – when it passes, we can expect the hurricane to return.

This does not mean that Poland should be hoping for another European crisis – our economic dependence and weak political potential would make its consequences painful, and we would not be able to count on support.

What the country should do is make sensible preparations – and find an optimal modus operandi – for life in the “new” EU, where it voice and position will be much weaker.

At the same time, Polish society needs to be convinced that such second-class membership will still be better than Polexit. None of this will be easy.

The original Polish version of this article can be found here. Translated by Ben Koschalka

Main image credit: Slawomir Kaminski / Agencja Gazeta

Marcin Kędzierski is the chief expert of the Jagiellonian Club’s Analysis Centre.