What are the prospects for the Tusk government?

Keep our news free from ads and paywalls by making a donation to support our work!

Notes from Poland is run by a small editorial team and is published by an independent, non-profit foundation that is funded through donations from our readers. We cannot do what we do without your support.

By Aleks Szczerbiak

The right-wing opposition candidate’s presidential election victory has radically changed Poland’s political dynamics, scuppering the liberal-centrist coalition government’s plans to reset its reform agenda. However, there is no immediate prospect of a change of prime minister or government and the coalition is likely to survive until the next election, albeit considerably weakened and divided.

Presidential election is a huge blow

In December 2023, a coalition government headed up by liberal-centrist Civic Platform (PO) leader Donald Tusk took office following eight years of rule by the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, currently the main opposition grouping. The coalition also includes the agrarian-centrist Polish People’s Party (PSL), liberal-centrist Poland 2050 (Polska 2050), and the New Left (Nowa Lewica) party.

Since it took office, Tusk’s government has had to “cohabit” with PiS-aligned President Andrzej Duda and lacks the three-fifths parliamentary majority required to over-turn his legislative veto.

The president can also delay the implementation of legislation by referring it to the Constitutional Tribunal, a powerful body which rules on the constitutionality of Polish laws, all of whose current members were appointed by previous PiS-dominated parliaments.

For sure, the Tusk government does not recognise the tribunal’s legitimacy and is refusing to implement its rulings, but if a presidential referral is made under the so-called “preventative control” mode, legislation only comes into effect after the tribunal’s ruling.

All of this meant that Duda acted as a major obstacle to the government’s attempts to unravel its PiS predecessor’s legacy, blocking key elements of its legislative and institutional reform programme. In particular, Duda hindered the government’s attempts to replace PiS’s state office appointees where legislation or presidential sign-off was required.

In some cases, the government used various legal loopholes to, for example, replace the management of state-owned media and the national prosecutor appointed by its PiS predecessor. Critics, and not just those aligned with PiS, argue that some of these get-arounds were legally and constitutionally dubious, if not outright illegal.

The ruling coalition was hoping that a victory in June’s presidential election for the PO candidate, Warsaw mayor Rafał Trzaskowski, would end this difficult period of cohabitation and speed up the process of political change. So the victory of the PiS-backed candidate, historian Karol Nawrocki, represents a huge blow to the Tusk government’s plans to reset its reform agenda.

Changing the political dynamics

The government can now expect continued resistance from a hostile president for the remainder of its term until the next parliamentary election, scheduled for autumn 2027, making it very hard for it to push forward with its policy agenda and elite replacement programme. In particular, the government will find it extremely difficult to unravel its PiS predecessor’s judicial reforms.

Around 2,500 judges appointed by Duda, including the majority of the country’s Supreme Court, were nominated by the National Judicial Council (KRS) after it was overhauled by PiS in 2018 so that most of its members are now chosen by elected bodies such as parliament rather than the legal profession, as was the case previously.

The Tusk government does not recognise these appointments referring to them disparagingly as “neo-judges” but, like Duda, the new president will block any legislation that he feels undermines their legitimacy and status.

Nawrocki’s victory has also radically changed the dynamics of Polish politics. The election was widely seen as, above all, a referendum on the Tusk government. Many Poles used it as an opportunity to channel their disappointment and discontent with the coalition’s perceived failure to deliver on the policy commitments that helped bring it to power in 2023. A June survey by the CBOS polling agency found that only 32% of Poles had a positive view of the Tusk government, while 44% had a negative one.

Most Poles feel that the Tusk government has been too passive, lacking any sense of purpose, and has subordinated the substance of governing to elite replacement and a so-called “reckoning” (rozlicenie) with its PiS predecessor for its alleged abuses of power.

This “reckoning” has itself often been perceived by government critics as a politically motivated witch-hunt or displacement activity, while government supporters feel that it has been implemented ineffectively or with insufficient vigour. Tusk himself made a number of extremely unhelpful interventions during the final stages of the presidential campaign, which were widely seen as contributing to Nawrocki’s victory.

PiS will be hoping that this will create political momentum that will carry it through to victory in the next parliamentary election. Moreover, before then the Tusk government will find it difficult to retain the loyalty and commitment of state officials if they view it as a lame-duck administration.

Indeed, even if the current ruling coalition were to secure a second term, this could simply result in a further period of political stalemate given Nawrocki will be in office until at least 2030.

Restructuring or a clearer programmatic agenda?

Tusk tried to regain the initiative by calling a parliamentary vote of confidence, which he won by a comfortable 243 to 210 margin. The government also appointed EU affairs minister Adam Szłapka as its first official spokesperson since coming to power; some figures in the ruling coalition blamed the administration’s unpopularity on its lack of a clear communication strategy.

However, the government’s problems do not stem simply from ineffective communication, and surviving the confidence vote was only the first of several hurdles that the Tusk government has to overcome. It now faces the much more serious problem of preventing its steady political drift and decomposition.

In his policy speech accompanying the parliamentary confidence vote, Tusk was very defensive and backward-looking. Focusing as much on PiS’s perceived failures as the government’s claimed successes, he offered nothing new and simply set out an updated and slightly modified version of his administration’s existing plans. It soon became clear that the government did not have a “Plan B” of how it should respond to the new, much more unfavourable political circumstances.

For sure, in July Tusk finally announced a long-delayed government reshuffle aimed at reinvigorating the ruling coalition and adjusting its policy focus. As part of a broader effort to cut down on overlapping competencies and boost its effectiveness, the restructured government will now include two newly-created “super-ministries”: one in charge of finance and the economy, the other focusing on energy policy.

However, personnel changes only make sense when part of a wider and more radical political opening that includes a much clearer programmatic agenda and change in the way that the government operates.

At the same time, given that an important element of the reshuffle was slimming down the overgrown Tusk administration and the unwillingness of the governing parties to give up their own ministerial nominees, it has proved to be a very divisive process.

Indeed, the Tusk administration does not appear to have a broader overarching programmatic agenda or strategic vision and accompanying set of governing priorities. Without a clear and convincing answer to the question of what the government’s purpose is and how it intends to implement its plans, it is difficult to locate even its successes in some kind of attractive and convincing narrative.

Tusk often comes across as a politician who, almost on principle, prefers specific high profile, short-term initiatives – and, critics argue, even when, from time-to-time, he discusses broader, longer-term more diffuse questions this does not appear to be based on any deeper programmatic foundations.

The presidential election result has also seriously weakened Tusk’s authority. Indeed, critics argue much of the incoherence in the government’s messaging is rooted in the prime minister’s rather dysfunctional management style, with coalition partners often finding out about government policy initiatives from journalists or Tusk’s social media posts.

At the same time, the lengthy, drawn-out government reconstruction process gave Poles the impression that the ruling coalition was focused more on its own internal disputes than the urgent issues facing the country.

Nonetheless, although questions have begun to surface about Tusk’s future leadership, there is no immediate prospect of a change of prime minister given that there are currently no obviously more attractive alternatives within the governing camp.

Surviving not reviving?

For sure, the next scheduled parliamentary election is more than two years away, enough time for political trends to change, and during his long political career Tusk has shown himself to be a master of comebacks. The government will be hoping that, even in these difficult circumstances it can demonstrate some successes, particularly on the economic front if inflation continues to fall, and growth and investment pick up.

However, the large state budget deficit, which the government will have to rein in if wants to avoid the EU’s excessive deficit procedure, will limit the Tusk administration’s room for manoeuvre to, for example, increase tax allowances substantially, one of PO’s flagship parliamentary election promises, and could even force it to make public expenditure cuts.

The government may also decide that it has no choice but to go for a full-frontal confrontation with Nawrocki, hoping that he will overreach so that it can blame its shortcomings on presidential obstruction.

However, to do this the government will need to pass a whole raft of laws and hope that Nawrocki vetoes them or refers them to the Constitutional Tribunal wholesale and indiscriminately rather than strategically and selectively. This would be a comfortable scenario for Tusk, who always prefers operating in a highly polarised political environment. A more nuanced approach by Nawrocki would be much more problematic for the government.

In fact, both the collapse of the Tusk government and an early legislative election remain unlikely scenarios. Dissolving parliament is virtually impossible without the consent of the governing parties, and recent polls suggest Tusk’s coalition partners would struggle to cross the 5% representation threshold if an early election were called.

Moreover, all of them want to maintain access to state appointments and patronage, often the “glue” that holds Polish governments and political formations together, for as long as possible. They also fear that a future PiS government might undertake its own “reckoning” of the current administration’s alleged abuses of power.

Rather, the coalition is likely to drift on until the next election, albeit increasingly weak and divided with its component parties looking to develop individual survival strategies rather than pursuing the government’s common interests.

Nonetheless, if Tusk comes to the conclusion that the governing coalition’s fate is sealed, he could stand down and make way for someone else to take over as prime minister ahead of the next election to avoid tarnishing his historical legacy with a humiliating defeat. Ambitious PO-nominated foreign secretary Radosław Sikorski, who was promoted to the additional role of deputy prime minister in the July reshuffle, is often touted as a possible successor, although he currently lacks a significant power base within the ruling party.

The government needs a game-changer

Nawrocki’s ability to block legislation, together with the authority that comes from a huge electoral mandate and political dynamics that this has unleashed, have severely weakened the government. The new political situation has deeply unsettled Tusk’s governing partners and his administration has not yet developed the kind of new opening that is required in a changed political situation.

To win, and even survive until, the next parliamentary election the governing camp needs a real game-changer that goes beyond an improved communication strategy and government reshuffle, and can quickly and decisively change the current dominant narrative. Tusk is safe for the moment but if over the next few months it becomes clear that the government lacks an effective recovery plan, or he comes to the conclusion that his political position cannot be rescued, at that point he may decide to stand down.

Notes from Poland is run by a small editorial team and published by an independent, non-profit foundation that is funded through donations from our readers. We cannot do what we do without your support.

Main image credit: Robert Kowalewski / Agencja Wyborcza.pl

Aleks Szczerbiak is Professor of Politics at the University of Sussex. The original version of this article appeared here.