What is the outlook for Poland’s radical right Confederation?

A diverse political conglomerate

The radical right-wing Confederation (Konfederacja) is a political conglomerate that was formed in the run-up to the 2019 European election but failed narrowly to cross the 5% parliamentary representation threshold.

However, the grouping made its breakthrough in the parliamentary election held later that year, securing 6.8% of the votes and 11 seats in the 460-member Sejm, Poland’s more powerful lower legislative chamber.

In spite of the apparent tensions between its component parts, the grouping held together and in the June-July 2020 presidential election its candidate, the articulate and relatively young nationalist politician Krzysztof Bosak, finished fourth, again with 6.8%.

Today, Confederation comprises three political groupings.

Firstly, radical free-market economic libertarians previously led by veteran political eccentric Janusz Korwin-Mikke who stood down as leader of his eponymous KORWiN’party in October 2022 due to his advanced years; and resigned from Confederation after he failed to be re-elected to parliament last October. Korwin-Mikke was replaced by the charismatic young entrepreneur Sławomir Mentzen, who renamed the party New Hope (Nowa Nadzieja).

Secondly, the radical nationalist National Movement (Ruch Narodowy) established on the wave of the annual Independence March organised in Warsaw every 11 November and led by Bosak.

Thirdly, the monarchist Confederation of the Polish Crown (Konfederacja Korony Polskiej) led by Confederation’s most controversial political figure Grzegorz Braun, who achieved international notoriety last December when he extinguished candles in the parliament building lit to celebrate the Jewish holiday of Hanukkah.

Peaking too early

Confederation faced some difficult moments when, following the outbreak of the war in 2022, it appeared to offer only lukewarm support to Ukraine. While opposing the Russian invasion, Confederation argued for a transactional approach with Ukraine and criticised the government, led at the time led by the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, for engaging too actively in the war.

However, over time Confederation’s risky narrative, that Poland needed to be robust in defending its interests when these clashed with Ukraine’s, gained support, as did its argument that Warsaw had been too generous towards the huge numbers of Ukrainian refugees who fled across the border after the invasion.

Last spring and early summer, Confederation surged to double-digit support with most polls predicting that that it would emerge as “kingmaker”, holding the balance of power in the new parliament.

Confederation’s growth was based largely on the grouping professionalising its image and consciously sidelining its most controversial figures, such as Korwin-Mikke and Braun, while foregrounding younger leaders who were able to communicate its radical programme in a more measured and reasonable way, particularly Mentzen who, together with Bosak, dominated its media profile.

In fact, Confederation peaked too early. Having no idea how to consolidate and build upon this momentum, it was unable to cope with the intense scrutiny that it then came under and Mentzen revealed a lack of experience and depth when thrust into the mainstream media spotlight.

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The party’s early success also gave its opponents time to develop an attractive counter-offer. Indeed, Confederation’s underperformance was, to some extent, linked to the better-than-expected result for the eclectic Third Way (Trzecia Droga) electoral alliance which comprised the agrarian-centrist Polish Peasant Party (PSL) and the liberal-centrist Poland 2050 (Polska 2050) grouping formed to capitalise on TV personality-turned-politician Szymon Hołownia’s strong third place in the 2020 presidential election.

The Third Way pitched its own free-market ideas and hoovered up some of those younger, aspirational voters who were attracted to Confederation as a “third force” challenging the duopoly of the liberal-centrist Civic Platform (PO), Poland’s main governing party since last December, and PiS, currently the largest opposition grouping, which have dominated Polish politics since 2005.

In the event, Confederation only secured a disappointing 7.2% of the vote in last October’s legislative poll, although the grouping did increase its Sejm representation to 18 seats allowing it to form its own parliamentary caucus (the threshold is 15).

Surging to third place

However, in the June European poll, Confederation achieved its best-ever election result, surging to third place with 12.1% of the votes and securing six MEP seats. If the European election result were to be repeated in a parliamentary poll, this would leave Confederation holding the balance of power.

For sure, radical parties generally perform better in “second order” elections, where electors are not choosing a government so are more likely to cast a protest vote, particularly European polls where “entry costs” are fairly low. Confederation had a motivated core electorate, together with a clear and unambiguous Eurosceptic programme.

Without a government (or existing European Parliament voting) record to defend, it could outflank PiS on issues where the latter had criticised EU policy, such as the “Green Deal” package of policy measures to help the union reduce carbon emissions, but which, critics argued, it accepted when in office between 2015-23.

In fact, Confederation ran a fairly uninspiring and low key European election campaign. Moreover, the highly polarised nature of the campaign made it very difficult for the grouping to cut through with its distinctive message.

Indeed, in many ways Confederation filled a vacuum, picking up voters who were looking for an alternative to the dominant bipolar divide, may have voted for the Third Way last October, but did not do so this time as the latter was now a member of the PO-led government.

At the same time, the fact that Confederation was crowded out of the campaign also meant that the media spotlight did not fall on the kind of controversial statements by some of its candidates and leaders, such as Braun, which caused the party all kinds of problems in previous elections.

Confederation leaders will also be hoping that the fact that Braun won a European Parliament seat will help to keep him out of the Polish national media and thereby help the grouping to continue to soften its image. However, Confederation’s European Parliament presence also has the potential to cause political embarrassment.

For example, three of its newly elected MEPs from the New Hope party came under fire for joining the new Europe of Sovereign Nations grouping led by the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, whose representatives are accused of adopting a pro-Russian stance and downplaying German Nazi war crimes. (Apparently, Braun was not invited to join any European grouping and will sit as an independent.)

A clear and distinctive social base

For sure, post-1989 Poland has a history of anti-establishment parties scoring sensational victories and then disappearing, often consumed by larger political groupings.

However, Confederation’s continuing survival and success suggests that there is a clear and distinctive social base for its brand of politics, comprising a segment of right-leaning voters who feel that the large state support and social welfare programmes that were the key to PiS’s electoral victories did not address their concerns.

Confederation enjoys particularly high levels of support among younger men living in smaller towns and rural areas. These voters often feel that they have limited chances for professional and career advancement, are frustrated with the apparent “glass ceiling” of vested interests and corrupt networks that stifles opportunities for them, and do not see state support as the solution to their problems.

Indeed, in the European election, for the first time Confederation finished first among the youngest voters, those aged under-30, 30% of whom supported the grouping (although it is worth noting that turnout in this age cohort was only 26.5%, whereas nearly 70% of them voted in last October’s parliamentary poll).

Confederation’s opponents have tried to discredit the party among potential new supporters by arguing that its leadership’s strong socially conservative views on moral-cultural issues such as abortion diverge from those of its social base of younger Poles.

They note that, for example, when it first ran for the European Parliament in 2019 Mentzen allegedly summed up Confederation’s five-point policy programme as: “we don’t want Jews, homosexuals, abortion, taxes and the EU” (known as the “Mentzen Five”).

However, Confederation politicians argue that this was an extract from a lengthier political marketing lecture cited out of context and simply presenting a theoretical example of what polling suggested the party’s voters wanted and not his own views; and that since then Mentzen has distanced himself from these remarks.

Moreover, for most Confederation voters, it is the party’s free-market economic policies rather than its conservative social values that are the grouping’s selling point. Although they have quite socially liberal views, Confederation voters also often see the “cancel culture” that they associate with the “woke” left as a greater threat to their personal freedom than the religious right.

Presidential election manoeuvring

Confederation’s excellent European election result may have arisen from specific factors favouring the grouping, such as its distinctive, radical Eurosceptic programme and highly motivated core electorate in the context of a “second order” election.

However, it also suggests that the grouping is starting to pick up support beyond its core constituency of young men. Indeed, according to the Politico poll of polls, Confederation has maintained its position as the “third force” in Polish politics, currently averaging around 13% support.

Moreover, in spite of the fact that it is very programmatically heterogeneous and there are undoubtedly behind-the-scenes tensions between its component parties and leaders, Confederation has by and large held together surprisingly well. Braun’s election to the European Parliament brought with it the added bonus that Confederation is no longer dependent upon him and his party’s remaining deputies to maintain its parliamentary caucus status.

Political attention now turns to the summer 2025 presidential election, where Confederation will be hoping for another strong showing. The grouping has once again said that it will select its candidate through internal primary elections, although no date has yet been set for these. The main contenders will be Bosak and Mentzen.

Bosak is a stronger mainstream media performer in formats such as interviews and debates. On the other hand, among Polish politicians Mentzen is probably the most effective utiliser of the internet, where he has developed a strong online presence and built up his profile through social media channels such as TikTok, presenting himself as a self-assured and authoritative financial expert and entrepreneur.

This is important because, given that Confederation is ignored by much of the traditional broadcast and print media, the internet is the main channel through which it communicates with its, predominantly younger, core electorate.

However, Braun is also very likely to throw his hat into the ring again. Although it is almost certainly not enough to secure the Confederation’s presidential nomination, Braun has a strong and very loyal grassroots following among the grouping’s supporters exemplified by his impressive European election performance, where he secured more than 100,000 votes.

Maintaining momentum will be difficult

However, keeping up momentum until the next parliamentary election, scheduled for autumn 2027, will be very challenging for Confederation, particularly if its more controversial leaders such as Braun slip through the media filter or Polish politics develops an even-stronger polarising dynamic leading some of its voters to move over to PO or PiS.

Indeed, even if Confederation can hold on to its current levels of support the fundamental question remains whether a grouping that has developed primarily as an “anti-system” repository for protest voters can make the kind of compromises required for it to transition into becoming a governing partner with a real influence on state policy?

This would almost certainly mean going into coalition with one of the major parties that it has developed in vigorous opposition to.

Main image credit: Grzegorz Celejewski / Agencja Wyborcza.pl

Aleks Szczerbiak is Professor of Politics at the University of Sussex. The original version of this article appeared here.