By Daniel Tilles

New evidence indicating that the future Pope John Paul II, while Archbishop Karol Wojtyła of Kraków, knew of child sexual abuse by priests under his authority has set off a political storm in Poland.

“In the context of what we know today about the systemic functioning of paedophilia in the Catholic church, there is something inappropriate about having schools named after John Paul II,“ said Adrian Zandberg, one of the leaders of The Left (Lewica) last Thursday.

“For most young Poles, Karol Wojtyła is just that funny old guy from memes, and not the highest moral authority,” he added.

Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, chairman of the agrarian Polish People’s Party (PSL), hit back, saying that “the left is trying to destroy the authority of John Paul II”

“His authority must not be destroyed,” declared Kosiniak-Kamysz. “Without him, the Iron Curtain would not have fallen, there would be no free world.”

While such jousting between the socially liberal left and conservative centre-right may not seem unusual, in this case the two figures and the parties they lead would likely both be part of any opposition government that aimed to bring the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party’s eight-year rule to an end at this autumn’s elections.

Polling shows that PiS is the most popular party, with support of around 35%. But such a share of the vote would not be enough to obtain a parliamentary majority.

That could open the door for the opposition to form a government. But to do so, any such coalition would, based on current polling, have to include The Left and PSL as well as the centrist Civic Coalition (KO) and Poland 2050 (Polska 2050).

Their contrasting positions on John Paul II’s legacy may seem trivial to an outside observer, but they are reflective of differences that, on the one hand, may help the opposition unseat PiS by broadening their appeal but, on the other, will make it hard for them to govern together.

A parliamentary vote last Friday regarding a resolution in “defence of the good name of Saint John Paul II” produced a telling split among the opposition.

PSL joined PiS to vote in favour; The Left was the only group that voted against it; while KO and Poland 2050 decided not to vote at all, arguing that the late pope should not be dragged into contemporary political disputes.

It can be different for people outside Poland to appreciate just how much of a cultural touchstone John Paul II is in his homeland.

For many of those who grew up before 1989, he was a beacon of hope. During his pilgrimages to communist Poland as pope, millions came out to see him.

For those who grew up in the 1990s, he was a living legend, with his ubiquitous image in homes around the country making him quite literally part of the furniture.

But for those who have grown up mostly after John Paul II’s death in 2005, he is a more abstract figure – for some a hero of the past but for others, as Zandberg notes, the subject of subversive memes but also the symbol of a Catholic church embroiled in revelations of historical sexual abuse and anger over its support for an unpopular near-total ban on abortion.

Attitudes towards the former pope are often indicative of individuals’ views on some of the most important and divisive issues facing Poland, such as abortion, LGBT rights and the role of the church in society.

It is in precisely these areas that the opposition is divided. On LGBT rights, for example, The Left is in favour of allowing same-sex marriage whereas last October the deputy head of PSL’s parliamentary caucus, Marek Sawicki, said that his party would not even support civil partnerships.

Earlier this month, PSL and Poland 2050 jointly called for a future opposition government to call a referendum on deciding the abortion law in its first 100 days in office. But The Left has said that it would not allow abortion, which it regards as a basic women’s right, to be put to a public vote.

The Left, meanwhile, wants to end Catholic catechism classes in public schools whereas some other opposition parties would not support such a measure.

Poland 2050, for example, has explicitly said it wants such lessons to continue in schools but with greater influence over them for school councils, teachers, and student bodies. Currently, all decisions on curriculums and teachers are made by the Catholic church.

This diversity of views on social issues may in fact be a strength for the opposition heading into the autumn elections. It allows those hoping to remove PiS from power to appeal to a wide range of voters, from urban liberals to rural conservatives.

Civic Platform (PO), which is the main force in KO, has long been pushing for the entire opposition to form a single coalition to stand in the elections. But trying to forge a shared platform, especially on social issues, would be near impossible, and efforts to do so would risk alienating many potential opposition voters.

However, while it is now all but certain that the opposition will not stand on a single list, this means that the problems of working together will simply be postponed until after the elections, if PiS fails to obtain a majority and the opposition can form a coalition government.

Trying to govern when they disagree on fundamental socio-cultural issues is a recipe for an unstable and unproductive administration.

There are also, it should be emphasised, many areas on which the opposition agree. Undoing PiS’s judicial policies is one; others include reforming public media – which have become a PiS mouthpiece – and reducing cronyism in state institutions and state-owned firms.

Yet such aims are easier said than achieved. Sorting out the mess that has been created in Poland’s legal system over the last eight years will take a long time if it is done properly. Trying to take shortcuts risks accusations of carrying out the same kinds of purges and constitutional violations as PiS.

While removing PiS-linked figures from public media and state firms will be something opposition parties can agree on, who to replace them with and how to do so will be much trickier. All governments in post-1989 Poland have been prone to cronyism to some extent and public media have always been under some degree of government influence.

Such problems are certainly not insurmountable. Poland since 1989 has always been governed by coalitions of one sort or another. Even the current PiS-led government has always contained smaller parties.

Yet, unless there is a dramatic shift between now and the autumn, any opposition coalition able to replace PiS would contain an unusually large number of ideologically diverse parties, and it is hard to imagine it functioning smoothly.

Unseating PiS – which has won six elections in a row since 2015 and remains ahead in the polls – will be tough. But winning the elections may turn out to be the easy part. Governing will be much harder.

Main image credit: Robert Kowaleski/Agencja Wyborcza.pl

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